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What is profoundly satisfying and exciting about this paper is that it successfully
argues for direct linkages between large-scale, macro-level social structures and
individual psychology. It does this by examining how intergroup and intragroup
processes work, at least as they create a psychology of subordinates. (There 
are some implications for the psychology of dominants here, but they are some-
what less fully worked out.) This kind of argument is rare in psychology,
although Apfelbaum reminds us that it is hardly absent. Our deep pleasure at
re-encountering this paper is tempered by our awareness that this argument, like
others that have aimed at this kind of linkage, remains woefully marginal or 
forgotten in the discipline of psychology.
The US context creates an exaggerated focus on the individual throughout 
the social science disciplines that aim to understand behavior. Psychology goes
further to focus not only on individuals, but on universal aspects of them (such 
as perceptual and cognitive capacities and personality traits). As a result, social
history (including the impact of social history on particular birth cohorts), social
forces (such as economic transformations) and the distribution of power between
groups are largely seen as outside the purview of psychologists. As Apfelbaum
notes, psychologists have been concerned about ‘harmful and pathogenic effects’
of social phenomena, but this concern has been expressed in a focus on thera-
peutic, rather than social, solutions. The argument in ‘Relations of Domination
and Movements of Liberation’ provides a remarkably comprehensive and 
generative theoretical framework in which to place certain research programs in
psychology. We believe that although these research programs have produced
significant understanding, placing them within Apfelbaum’s framework would
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both permit more powerful interpretations of existing findings, and allow us to
ask important new questions.
Apfelbaum’s account identifies several specific effects of the process of
‘degrouping’, or breaking down a group’s sense of itself as a group. Two of these
have been subject to substantial amounts of research in psychology and in 
organizational behavior: the study of ‘tokens’ (see, for example, Cohen and
Swim, 1995; Gutek and Morasch, 1982; Kanter, 1977; Wolman and Frank, 1975;
Yoder, 1991, 1994) and the study of people’s belief in certain allegedly ‘univer-
sal rules’ (for example, in a ‘just world’; see Furnham and Procter, 1989; Lerner
and Miller, 1978; Lipkus and Bissonnette, 1996; O’Connor et al., 1996). Early
research on tokens examined the effects of being a token on the token, with little
or no attention to the effects of the token process on others who share that social
status (but are not themselves tokens). Apfelbaum’s perspective enables us to
shift from the individual token to the meaning of the mere existence of tokens for
others in the subordinate, or even in the dominant, group. If we consider the token
as a phenomenon specific to degrouping a subordinate group, we would expect
being a solo group representative in a small group context to differ in its effects
for the token and for others within or outside the small group if that solo indi-
vidual represents a dominant versus a subordinate group. If that individual repre-
sents a subordinate group, being a token is part of a set of processes that isolate
group members from the support and affirmation that comes from group identifi-
cation. In contrast, if a solo represents a dominant group, being a token might
well simply reinforce the hegemony of the dominant group. 
The same sort of clarity is gained if we draw on Apfelbaum to consider the 
literature on individuals’ endorsement of belief in a ‘just world’, or in the fairness
of universal rules (or of rules that challenge universal rules, like affirmative
action). Here, Apfelbaum’s framework would force us to examine how indi-
viduals’ positions within dominant and subordinate groups alter the meaning 
of their endorsement (or challenge) of universal rules. Thus, when members of
dominant groups endorse universal rules, they express their own identification
with a system in which they are privileged. When, in contrast, members of sub-
ordinate groups endorse those rules, they are expressing a belief that requires
their own lack of access to a supportive group identification. With this per-
spective in mind, it would be impossible to view endorsement of these views as
‘individual differences’; we would have to examine the differential implications
of one’s own and one’s observation of others’ endorsement of those beliefs for
members of different groups. 
We have found that Apfelbaum’s theoretical account provides similar illumi-
nation in a field much closer to home for us. Our own work together focuses 
on issues of social identity, specifically women’s identification with their own
gender, racial/ethnic and class groups (Henderson-King and Stewart, 1994,
1997). In previous research, we have explored the implications of these identifi-
cations for women’s psychological well-being (e.g. Ostrove et al., under review),
but especially for their political socialization (Cole and Stewart, 1996; Cole et al.,
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1998; Stewart et al., 1998). Apfelbaum’s notion that identification with a sub-
ordinate group (women, various subordinated racial/ethnic groups, etc.) is the
basis for ‘regrouping’ strikes us as particularly useful in thinking about the func-
tions and consequences of social identities, and for recognizing that subordinate
social identities are crucially different from dominant ones (see the developing
literature on ‘whiteness’, e.g. Fine et al., 1997).
In our current research we are examining identification with feminism (a
‘regrouped’ identification with women) in different generations. Scholars of 
feminism in a number of academic disciplines, as well as in the popular press,
have noted the paradox that although younger generations have become increas-
ingly liberal in their gender attitudes, they seem to have become less willing to
identify themselves as feminists (Buschman and Lenart, 1996; Griffin, 1989;
Kamen, 1991). The popular phrase, ‘I’m not a feminist, but . . .’ signifies many
women’s reluctance to take on the label or identity ‘feminist’, despite the fact that
they publicly espouse at least some feminist beliefs. We suspect that such
women, who lack group identification, will be much less likely to engage in 
collective action on behalf of women than women who hold similar beliefs but
do adopt the label (identify with the group). To understand this problem, we 
studied three groups of women in three generations: feminists, who believe in
equal rights for women and consciously adopt the label ‘feminist’; egalitarians,
who believe in equal rights for women but reject the label ‘feminist’; and
non-feminists, who reject both equal rights for women and the label ‘feminist’.
Among these groups of women, we were able to examine implications of femi-
nist identity for commitment to social change and engagement in political action. 
Like other scholars in the social identity tradition, we have focused on the
behavioral and personal consequences of belonging to the group ‘feminists’,
rather than on specific processes and power relations that press individuals to
‘degroup’ (or lose identification with the group) and the factors which enable 
others to ‘regroup’. Using Apfelbaum’s framework would lead us to look, for
example, at the processes of tokenism and universal rules to understand the 
differences between feminists and egalitarians. For example, feminist and egali-
tarian women may both believe that there are few ability or essential differences
between men and women, but only egalitarians should endorse universal rules (as
permitting them to get ahead, for example) or view tokens favorably (as evidence
that individual women, through hard work, can get ahead). In contrast, feminists
should reject universal rules (e.g. belief in meritocracy) and endorse some ideas
that challenge them (such as affirmative action). Similarly, they should be suspi-
cious of token processes, whether they affect them directly or other women. In a
related manner, feminists and egalitarians should differ in attitudes and values
reflecting regrouping (with feminists affected by regrouping in ways egalitarians
are not). Thus, feminists should attach greater value than egalitarians to evidence
of women’s cultural and historical achievements. It may also be possible to 
use Apfelbaum’s framework to help understand non-feminists’ attitudes. For
example, non-feminists may be satisfied with the status quo, and therefore 
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oblivious to the effects of degrouping. In contrast, egalitarians recognize the
effects of degrouping (in women’s lesser cultural value and isolation), but see
universal rules and token processes as obviating the need for regrouping.
While we have a clear personal stake in mining Apfelbaum’s theorizing for 
our own work, we are equally struck by its value not only for understanding psy-
chological phenomena, but for understanding the recent history of feminist 
theory. It is useful, we think, to view both 1970s ‘cultural feminism’ and later
‘difference feminism’ arguments as part of a process of regrouping, or respond-
ing to a prior degrouping. Similarly, recognizing the need for groups to ‘pool
grievances’ as a basis for regrouping sheds new light on the energy provided by
consciousness-raising in the 1970s, and the potency of accounts of women’s 
vulnerability to domestic violence, incest and sexual assault. At the same time,
Apfelbaum’s framework may help us understand certain conflicts and debates in
feminism. For example, the urgency of the need for regrouping helps account for
the centrality of identity politics in contemporary feminist theorizing, as well as
for the debate about whether it is time to abandon a feminism grounded in a
recognition of women as ‘victims’.
We do not mean to suggest that Apfelbaum’s framework, as articulated in the
paper reproduced in this volume, provides a full and complete guide to our own
or others’ work on social identities. Important theoretical work remains to be
done. For example, the contemporary articulation of notions of multiple, poten-
tially conflicting (subordinate) identities, as well as of intersectionality (or the
unique identities created by the intersection of different dominant and subordi-
nate identities), requires elaboration of Apfelbaum’s account in this paper.
Equally, for our own developing work on activism across difference (whites com-
mitted to antiracist activism, male feminists, straights in gay–straight alliances,
etc.), we need to understand more about the conditions under which members of
dominant groups act outside of identification with their group. Here, as usual, we
view Apfelbaum as providing a wonderful starting point. She allows us to
rephrase our questions: Why do some members of dominant groups notice and
object to degrouping of other groups? Why do some members of dominant
groups encourage and support regrouping of other groups? Asking the questions
in this way helps. But there is clearly more work to be done. Apfelbaum reminds
us that the process of ‘refinding a buried history’ gives strength to regrouping.
There is much in her work to strengthen and sustain feminist psychologists; we
must work, though, to keep it from being buried.
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